Structural Problems of Taiwan’s Labor Brokerage System

by 共力研究社 (TPEC)
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Taiwan’s labor brokerage system is a recruitment and administrative mechanism designed to facilitate employers’ hiring needs, but it has generated numerous systemic abuses. Under the current system, most blue-collar migrant workers must enter Taiwan through brokerage agencies and are, in practice, subject to dual control by both brokers and employers. Brokers are responsible for recruitment, documentation, job assignments, and daily management, while charging brokerage fees to workers or employers, granting them disproportionate power within labor relations.

According to the Taiwan International Workers Association (TIWA), migrant workers often incur heavy debt even before arriving in Taiwan due to high brokerage fees, creating strong dependency on their jobs and employers. Furthermore, migrant workers are legally prohibited from freely changing employers. Unauthorized resignation may result in contractual penalties, loss of work authorization, or forced repatriation, effectively restricting workers’ freedom of employment. This institutional arrangement severely weakens migrant workers’ bargaining power and places them at high risk of forced labor.

The recent case involving Giant Manufacturing Co., Ltd., a major bicycle manufacturer, highlights this structural risk. Due to migrant worker debt, wage withholding, and restrictions on freedom of movement, the company was found by U.S. authorities to present indicators of forced labor, resulting in the temporary detention of its products. Although Giant later adopted a zero-brokerage-fee policy, the case underscores the entrenched low-wage structure, power asymmetries, and human rights risks inherent in Taiwan’s brokerage system, demonstrating the urgent need for systemic reform.